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SECTION 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The mater~a1 conta~ned in th~s report ~s a result of the study of 
the Redundant Strapdown Inertial Measurement Unit (RSDIMU) being developed 
and evaluated by the NASA Langley Research Center. The work was conducted 
by The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc. (CSDL) under NASA Contract 
NASl-16887 ent~tled the False Alarm/Reliability Analyses for a Separated 
Dual-Fail Operat~onal Redundant Strapdown Inertial Measurement Unit. 
It ~s a follow-on to a previous effort described in Reference 1. The 
goal of the initial effort was to assess the feasibility of performing 
failure detection and isolation (FDI) for the RSDlMU ~n an air transport 
environment, develop and evaluate FDI algorithms for the RSDIMU, and 
analyze FDI system performance. 
The present study uses the results of the previous effort as a 
basis. The RSDIMU sensor configurat~on, a description of some of the 
basic concepts assoc~ated with FDI and a summary of the major results of 
the previous study are presented in Section 2 to provide the reader with 
some background into the system be~ng analyzed and concepts being evaluated. 
One of the maJor reasons for consider~ng the dual, separated RSDIMU 
is to improve the surv~vability of the aircraft when damage to the iner-
tial measurement unit occurs, while ach~eving a desired level of fault 
tolerance with fewer instruments. Th~s subject is addressed ~n Sect~on 3 
where a methodology for quantitatively analyzing the reliability of re-
dundant avionics systems in general and the dual, separated RSDlMU system 
in part~cular ~s developed and applied. A Markov model reliabil~ty 
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analys~s tool is developed and applied. The results of the parametric 
study of significant instrument and FDI system variables are presented 
and discussed. 
The detect~on and isolation of failures of the dual, separated 
RSDIMU ~s accomplished by comparing a function of the sensor outputs 
with a threshold. The thresholds for a co located cluster of ~nstruments 
must account for the nom~nal sensor errors and a~rcraft dynamic environ-
ment to detect the smallest poss~le level of fa~lure without encounter-
~ng a prohibitive number of false alarms or the false detection of 
failures. The separation of the RSDIMU into two separated clusters 
severely complicates the selection of the thresholds. The ~ncremental 
structural mode and accelerometer lever arm effects between the locations 
of the two instrument clusters must now be taken ~nto account. A tech-
nique is developed and analyzed for generating the thresholds for a dual, 
separated RSDIMU taking all of the previously mentioned factors into 
account. Spec~al emphas~s ~s given to the detection of mult~ple, non-
concurrent failures. Section 4 contains the results. 
Section 5 summarizes the results of this study. 
Dr. P. Motyka was the project leader for CSDL while Dr. J. Lee 
developed and exercised the RSDIMU Markov model discussed ~n Sect~on 3. 
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SECTION 2 
BACKGROUND AND RESULTS OF THE PREVIOUS STUDY 
2.1 Sensor Configuration 
The inertial measurement un~t shown ~n F~gure 1 is a redundant 
strapdown package emp1oy~ng four two-degree-of-freedom (TDOF) gyros 
(accelerometers) in a semi-octahedral geometry. The instruments are 
pos~t~oned such that the spin (pendulous) axes are normal to the four 
faces of the se~-octahedron and point out. The two measurement axes 
of the gyros and accelerometers lie in the plane of the face and are 
symmetric about the face centerline. The RSDIMU consists of two separate 
packages (faces 1 and 2, faces 3 and 4) which may be spatially separated 
along a track in the lateral direction. Thus, it may be treated as two 
tetradic IMUs as indicated in Figure 2. The reason for separating the 
RSDIMU ~nto two halves is to provide protection against damage effects 
due to lightning, structural failure, etc. The benefits of redundancy 
in the form of improved system reliabil~ty are retained by using sensor 
~nformation from both halves of the IMU for fa~lure detect~on and ~sola­
tion purposes. 
The no~nal geometry matr~x, def~n~ng the sensor ~nput axes 
relat~ve to the vehicle body axes ~s 
3 
-z 
IMU1 
-----I .. ~ x 
y 
y 
F1gure 1. RSDIMU 1nstrument geometry. 
x • OFFSET OF IMU FROM 
o VEHICLE CENTERLINE 
xS' SEPARATION OF IMU1. 2 
FROM IMU CENTERLINE 
-------~---L-----------~x 
IMU2 
y 
F1gure 2. Separat10n of sensor configuration 1nto two IMUs. 
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The dashed line indicates the separation of the RSDIMU into two halves. 
2.2 General Concepts of FDI 
Th~s section is included to prov~de the reader with a background 
in the general concepts applied to detect and isolate sensor fa~lures. 
It will allow a greater understanding and appreciat~on of the material 
presented ~n the following sections of the report. 
In order to detect and isolate sensor failures, a system of parity 
equations is solved. Par~ty equat~ons are linear combinat~ons of the 
sensor outputs selected to enhance the uncertainties (fa~lures) associated 
w~th the sensors. Furthermore, the effects of the quantity which the 
~nstruments measure, i.e., the angular rates or linear accelerations, are 
removed from consideration by the parity equations. 
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Failure detection occurs as a result of compar~ng the par~ty 
equation residuals or a function of them to a threshold. If the thresh-
old is exceeded, a failure is declared and the failure ~s then isolated. 
Fa~lure isolat~on is accomplished using the parity equation residuals. 
Several methods are used depending upon the algorithm employed. Logical 
operat~ons based on the res~duals which exceed the threshold ~s one 
technique used, e.g., a combination of residuals exceeding the thresholds 
~nd~cates the failure of a particular sensor. Another approach involves 
the dot product of the vector of parity equation res1duals w~th vectors 
def~ned by the coeff~c1ents of the parity equations to isolate a failure. 
Th~s, ~n essence, 1S the methodology applied to detect and ~solate 
sensor fa~lures. However, complications arise when applied to a practical 
situat~on. For example, the parity equat~on residuals are ideally zero 
when a failure ~s not present and nonzero when a failure has occurred. 
In real~ty, the residuals are nonzero because of the uncertaint~es as-
sociated with the sensors, i.e., the sensor errors, sensor noise, struc-
tural mode effects, accelerometer lever-arm effects, etc. The res~duals 
due to these factors d~ctate the level of failure which can be detected 
since they do not ar1se from failures and are a result of normal, although 
undesirable, sensor behavior. In a dynamic environment these uncertain-
ties may be executed to a greater degree. To avo~d the false detection 
of failures, 1.e., false alarms, the thresholds may have to be compensated 
for th~s effect. One poss~ble approach to handling th1s problem ~s the 
use of dynam1c thresholds wh~ch are a function of the env~ronment. Another 
is 1n-flight ~dent~ficat~on and compensat1on of the sensor error effects 
~n the FDI decision process. 
Normally, unf~ltered sensor data 1S used to detect and 1solate 
sensor fa~lures of a large magnitude since ~t ~s desired to remove the1r 
effects before they affect the controllabil~ty 9f the veh~cle. Another 
factor 1n the design of FDI systems ~s that the effects of small magn~-
. 
tude failures may be masked by the instrument uncertainty effects. Fil-
tering of the parity equation residuals may have to be introduced into 
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the FDI system to enhance their detectability. This is at the expense of 
a longer detection time and a des~gn tradeoff ex~sts. The presence of 
several channels ~n the FDI system to detect and isolate different levels 
of fa~lures may result. 
Two FDI algorithms have been investigated during the course of 
this study; the Edge Vector Test (EVT) and the Generalized Likelihood 
Test (GLT). They w~ll be def~ned later ~n the report when it becomes 
expeditious to do so. 
2.3 Summary of the Previous Study 
As mentioned previously, this effort is a follow-on to a previous 
study. During the in~tial study, the feasibility of performing FDI for 
the RSDIMU ~n an air transport environment was demonstrated and a method-
ology was developed for the design and evaluation of fault-tolerant 
systems. A spectrum of fa~lure magnitudes was accounted for. The RSDIMU 
was also used for both flight control and nav~gation purposes during 
this study. The GLT and EVT FDI algorithms were compared with respect 
to factors such as the parity equations used, software requirements, 
fail~e detection and isolation capability, thresholds, etc. The GLT 
algorithm ~s preferred because of its technical maturity. It was also 
determ~ned that dyna~c thresholds were needed for the soft failure 
channel and an algor~thm developed for generating them. 
The block d~agram of the FDI system which evolved from this study 
is shown in Figure 3. This system reflects the ideas and conclusions 
addressed in the previous paragraphs and will be used as the bas~s for 
the technical development in the succeeding sections. 
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SYSTEMS 
F~gure 3. FDI algor~thm block d~agram. 
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SECTION 3 
RSDIMU RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 
3.1 Introduct1on 
The goal of th1s sect10n 1S to develop and apply a methodology 
for quantitatively analyzing the reliab1lity of redundant aV10n1CS 
systems 1n general and the dual, separated RSDIMU system in part1cular. 
The need for an analyt1c reliabi11ty evaluation tool to evaluate 
the performance of fault-tolerant systems 1S clear. Evaluat10n of these 
systems by test1ng 1S proh1b1t1ve S1nce the1r h1ghly re11able nature 
imp11es a large number of test samples and/or extremely long test periods. 
In addit1on, the probab1listic nature of fault-tolerant systems precludes 
applicat10n of convent10nal analysis techn1ques such as covariance 
analysis. 
CSDL's approach to this problem is to apply a Markov re11ab1l1ty 
evaluat10n model, defined 1n terms of the operational states of the system, 
to predict system performance through f1gures-of-merit. This methodology 
has been developed and refined during the course of several technolog1cal 
development programs. It can be used to obtain quant1tative data to 
support the spec1f1cat1on and validation of requ1rements, architecture 
evaluation, the cross compar1son of systems, des1gn tradeoffs, and the 
efficient al1ocat10n of resources throughout the defin1tion, des1gn, 
and test phases of the1r development. The Markov model is def1ned in 
terms of states which represent the operational modes of the system. 
These 1nclude not only the normal mode of system operat1on w1th no failed 
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components present but the degraded modes as well which represent the 
state of system operation arrived at because of correct or incorrect 
dec1sions made by the redundancy management system, e.g., the detection 
and isolation of fa1lures, false alarms, m1ssed detections, etc. In 
this sense, the model is def1ned to truly represent the operation of 
the fault-tolerant system. The Markov model is used to generate the 
probability of the system being in one of the defined operational states 
after a prespecified length of time using the single-step state-transit10n 
probabilities. 
Different measures of system performance are obtained from the 
Markov model approach. One of the most 1mportant and widely used 1S the 
probability of the system becoming inoperative by the end of the mission. 
Other outputs which can be obtained are the time histories of the state 
probabilit1es, the state occupancy stat1st1cs, and the mean and variance 
of the t1me to system failure. 
3.2 Description o~Procedure 
The Markov model evolves from a system block diagram outlining 
the partitioning of the system and the interconnections among the various 
system components. This block diagram is then used to define the system's 
operational states. A s1gn1f1cant problem 1n develop1ng a Markov mOdel 
lies in determ1n1ng the states that are sufficient to character1ze the 
operat10n of the system wh1le at the same t1me limiting their number 
and, hence, the order of the system for computat1onal reasons. The 
order of the Markov model grows exponentially as a function of the number 
of states. 
The next step in the procedure is to develop single-step state-
trans1tion diagrams. These diagrams indicate the states that may evolve 
from a given 1nitial state in a single step, the dec1s10ns made in 
achieving these states, and the probabilities associated with these de-
cisions. The state-transit10n probabilities are then calculated from 
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the state-transition diagram and put into matrix form for Markov proba-
bility theory appl~cat~on. Each element of the state-transition matrix 
is the probab~lity of going from an in~tial state to another state in a 
single time step. 
The last step ~n the procedure ~nvolves the propagation in time 
of the system probab~l~t~es by raising the matrix of trans~tion proba-
b~lit~es to a power equal to the number of t~me steps. Aux~liary stat-
~stical ~nformation regard~ng the performance of the FDI system is also 
calculated. 
3.3 Summary of Equat~ons 
Let P represent the single-step state-transit~on matrix of the 
Markov model. The element P(k,t) of P des~gnates the probabil~ty that 
state t makes a trans~tion to state k in a s~ngle time step. The states 
are ordered ~n such a way that trans~t~ons from any state t to any state 
k where k < t is imposs~ble. Th~s is equivalent to assuming that the 
failures and FDI dec~sions are ~rrevers~ble. P is a lower tr~angular 
square matrix w~th its d~ension equal to the number of states, n. Let 
o(t) represent the n-dimensional state probab~lity vector for the system. 
The follow~ng relat~ons must hold for the columns of P and for o(t) 
n L: P (k , t) = 1. a for t = 1, .•• , n 
k=1 
n L: 0t (t) = 1.0 for all t 
t=1 
These relat~ons reflect the requ~rement that each state must undergo a 
trans~tion to some state (perhaps itself) ~n each time step, and that 
the system must be ~n one of the n states of the model at all t~mes. 
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Assuming that the probabilities which define the elements of the 
matrix P are invariant in time, the state probability vector oCt) at any 
time t can be computed by 
oCt) = 
where the exponent N des~gnates the number of time steps ~n an interval 
of length t. The matr~x pN is referred to as the N-step trans~t~on 
probability matrix. The individual columns of pN thus correspond to the 
state probab~lity vectors o~(t) given that the system was initialized 
to state ~. 
3.4 > Definition of the RSDIMU Operational States 
The RSDIMU system block diagram, shown in Figure 4, forms the 
basis for the discussion regard~ng the defin~tion of the operat~onal 
states for the rel~ab~lity model presented in Tabl~ 1. This d~agram 
indicates the system components, their level of redundancy, and their 
interconnections. The manner in which the RSDIMU is separated ~nto two 
halves ~s also apparent from this diagram. 
The operational states of the RSDIMU have been defined to reflect 
failures of the sensors only and the FDI system decisions made with regard 
to them. The ~mpact of failures of the computers and additional peripheral 
equipment on system rel~ability has been neglected during this study. 
However, there is no reason why the reliab~lity analysis could not be 
modif~ed to reflect these additional components. The effects of damage 
have been cons~dered. 
27 states have been defined for the RSDIMU Markov model. The means 
by which some of the states are arrived at is discussed to give the reader 
insight ~nto the reasons for the~r being def~ned. The first state is 
the assumed starting condition for system operat~on where no sensor 
failures are present. States 2 through 25 reflect various stages of 
12 
FOUR 
COMPUTERS 
Figure 4. RSOIMU system conf~gurat~on. 
degraded RSOIMU system operation due to the effects of sensor failures 
and the FOI system decisions made during the course of system operat~on. 
For example, State 2 represents the condition where a sensor has fa~led 
but the fa~lure has not yet been detected by the FOI system. State 3 
defines the operational mode where either the fa~lure present ~n State 2 
has been detected and correctly isolated and the system reconf~gured to 
remove ~ts effects, a gyro false alarm has occurred'when the system was 
initially in State 1 and an unfailed sensor removed from operation, or 
a gyro failure occurs while ~n State 1 and it is detected and correctly 
isolated. 
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Table 1. Definition of RSDIMU Operational States. 
State Definit10n 
4 Gyros in Use. 4 Good; 
1 4 Accelerometers in Use. 4 Good 
4 Gyros in Use. 3 Good. 1 Failed; 
2 4 Accelerometers in Use. 4 Good 
3 3 Gyros in Use. 3 Good; 
4 Accelerometers in Use. 4 Good 
4 4 Gyros in Use. 4 Good; 
4 Accelerometers in Use. 3 Good. 1 Failed 
5 
4 Gyros in Use. 4 Good; 
3 Accelerometers in Use. 3 Good 
4 Gyros in Use. 3 Good. 1 Failed; 
6 
4 Accelerometers in Use. 3 Good. 1 Failed 
7 4 Gyros in Use. 3 Good. 1 Failed; 
3 Accelerometers in Use. 3 Good 
8 
3 Gyros in Use. 3 Good; 
4 Accelerometers in Use. 3 Good. 1 Failed 
9 
3 Gyros in Use. 3 Good; 
3 Accelerometers in Use. 3 Good 
10 
3 Gyros in Use. 2 Good. 1 Failed; 
4 Accelerometers in Use. 4 Good 
11 2 Gyros in Use. 2 Good; 
4 Accelerometers in Use. 4 Good 
12 
4 Gyros in Use. 4 Good; 
3 Accelerometers in Use. 2 Good. 1 Failed 
13 4 Gyros in Use. 4 Good; 
2 Accelerometers in Use. 2 Good 
14 
3 Gyros in Use. 2 Good. 1 Failed; 
4 Accelerometers in Use. 3 Good. 1 Failed 
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Table 1. Defin~tion of RSDIMU Operat~onal States (cont). 
State Deflnl tlon 
15 3 Gyros In Use, 2 Good, 1 Failed; 
3 Accelerometers In Use, 3 Good 
2 Gyros In Use, 2 Good; 
16 4 Accelerometers In Use, 3 Good, 1 FaIled 
17 2 Gyros In Use, 2 Good; 
3 Accelerometers In Use, 3 Good 
. 
18 
4 Gyros In Use, 3 Good, 1 FaIled; 
3 Accelerometers In Use, 2 Good, 1 Folled 
19 3 Gyros In Use, 3 Good; 
3 Accelerometers In Use, 2 Good, 1 FaIled 
20 4 Gyros In Use, 3 Good, 1 FaIled; 
2 Accelerometers In Use, 2 Good 
21 3 Gyros In Use, 3 Good; 
2 Accelerometers In Use, 2 Good 
22 3 Gyros In Use, 2 Good, 1 FaIled; 
3 Accelerometers In Use, 2 Good, 1 FaIled 
23 3 Gyros In Use, 2 Good, 1 FaIled; 
2 Accelerometers In Use, 2 Good 
24 2 Gyros In Use, 2 Good; 
3 Accelerometers In Use, 2 Good, 1 FaIled 
25 2 Gyros In Use, 2 Good; 
2 Accelerometers In Use, 2 Good 
26 Same as 25, but RSDII1U damaged 
27 FaIled State 
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States 4 and 5 are similar to States 2 and 3 except that accel-
erometer failures are present rather than gyro failures. The occurrence 
of a gyro failure when an accelerometer failure exists and vice versa 
leads to the definition of State 6 as one of the possible modes of RSOIMU 
operation. State 7 results from anyone of four events; the detection 
and isolation of the accelerometer fa~lure present in State 6, an un-
detected gyro failure when the system is operating in State 5, or an 
accelerometer false alarm or fa~lure which is detected and correctly 
isolated when the system ~s in State 2. 
The rest of the Markov model states through 25 evolve as a result 
of similar thinking as more sensor fa~lures and FOI decisions are made 
during the course of operat~on of the RSOIMU system. Eventually, a mode 
of operation results for which two unfa~led gyros and two unfailed 
accelerometers are available for use. Th~s is State 25. The only other 
states that require elaboration are States 26 and 27. State 26, although 
similar to State 25, d~ffers from ~t in that ~t ar~ses as a result of 
damage effects to the RSOIMU. It is def~ned separately should it be 
desired to assess the impact of damage effects independently of the normal 
mode of system operat~on. The last state of the model is def~ned as 
the failed state, State 27, which includes modes of operation for wh~ch 
there are fewer than two unfakled gyros or two unfailed accelerometers 
available, either because of damage effects or sensor failures or the 
presence of two fa~led gyros or two failed accelerometers s~multaneously. 
The question naturally ar~ses concerning the definition of a 
suitable and val~d f~gure-of-mer~t for assess~ng the reliability perform-
ance of the RSOIMU system. The measure selected ~s the probability of 
having a failure present ~n the system. It includes the probability of 
the system be~ng ~n anyone of the states listed ~n Table 2. This param-
eter was chosen to assess system performance s~nce it covers all ranges of 
FOI system performance. For example, ~f the FOI system is perfectly 
designed, all of the instrument failures will be detected and correctly 
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Table 2. States defining system failure. 
State Failure Present 
Gyro Accel 
2 .; 
4 .; 
6 .; .; 
7 .; 
8 .; 
~ 
10 .; 
12 .; 
14 .; .; 
15 .; 
16 .; 
18 .; .; 
19 .; 
20 .; 
22 .; .; 
23 .; 
24 .; 
27 .; .; 
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~solated and the probability of being ~n State 27 will be the measure 
of the reliability of the system. However, ~f the performance of the 
FDI system is poor, failures w~ll not be detected and isolated as quickly 
or as correctly and the probability of being in the intermed~ate states 
will more aptly def~ne system performance. Any system for which a fa~lure 
is present is detrimental to achieving the goals of the system and the 
definition of the probability of having a fa~lure present in the system 
as a figure-of-merit covers all extremes of system operation and performance. 
3.5 State Transit~on Diagrams 
The next step ~n the development of the RSDIMU Markov reliability 
model involves the generat~on of the state trans~tion diagrams. These 
diagrams ind~cate the effects of component fa~lures, the FDI system de-
cis~ons, and the operat~onal states wh~ch result from them g~ven an 
initial starting state. As an example, Figure 5 shows the transitions 
out of the ~n~tial state of RSDIMU system operation for all possible 
component failures, all possible FDI dec~s~ons, and the effects of damage. 
The final state of opera~on which results from each of these factors 
is also ind~cated. The state transit~on diagrams also reflect the basic 
structure of the FDI system presented ~n Figure 3 in that three channels 
of operat10n have been defined to cover hard, med1um, and soft failures. 
Once generated, the state transit~on d~agrams are used to generate 
the state trans~tion probab~lit~es or elements of the single-step state 
transit10n matrix. Th~s ~s done by mult~plying the entr~es along a given 
path to obta~n the cond~t~onal probab~lity of trans~tion~ng to the end 
state in a s~ngle t~me step g~ven operat~on in the initial state. 
3.6 ~ddit~onal Markov Model Assumptions and Considerat~ons 
The state trans~tion probab~lities for the RSDIMU reflect the 
fact that the three channels of FDI system operation are performed at 
different rates. This is done by assum~ng that the Markov model ~s run 
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PF4G 
1-PDAM PF4A 
1-PF4G 
PFA4GM 3 PFA4GS 3 
-PF4A 1-PFA4GM 1-PFA4GS 
PFA4AM 5 PFA4AS 
1-PFA4AM 1-PFA4AS 
PDAM 
F~gure 5. RSDIMU state trans~tion diagram. 
at the lowest FDI system frequency, i.e., that of the soft-failure 
channel, and modifying the probabilities assoc~ated w~th the hard- and mid-
fa~lure channels to account for the h~gher frequency of operation. For 
example, the accelerometer hard-failure channel probabilities are modi-
fied as follows to reflect the fact that it operates at a frequency 
which is 25 t~mes faster than that of the soft-failure channel. 
PD4AH2 1.0- (1.0 - PD4AH )25 50 
PI4AH2 1.0- (1.0 - PI4AH50 ) 
25 
(1.0 - 25 PFA4AH2 = 1.0- PFA4AH50 ) 
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The Markov model probabilities must also reflect any effects of 
IMU separation and communication between the two halves of the system. 
Communication allows treating the dual, separated system as a single 
cluster of instruments for FOI purposes. That is, information from both 
halves can be used to detect and isolate fa~lures. The FOI system 
thresholds must also account for separation effects. They must be 
selected to account for instrument uncertainties such as sensor errors, 
sensed structural mode effects, and accelerometer lever-arm effects, to 
avoid the detr~mental effects of false alarms. The state transition 
probabilities must then reflect the FOI system probabilit~es which result 
from the selection of the thresholds to account for these factors. 
Another assumption that could have been made during the develop-
ment of the Markov model for the RSOIMU but was not is that if a fa~lure 
is not detected and/or isolated after a specified number of time steps, 
the system is ~n the failed state. As the present Markov model is de-
fined, a failure can be detected and/or ~solated continuously after its 
occurrence until the mission term~nates. 
3.7 Nominal Markov Model Parameters 
The nominal parameters selected for evaluating the rel~ab~lity 
of the RSOIMU v~a the Markov model are l~sted ~n Table 3. A system with 
perfect FOI has been assumed, i.e., a probability of 1.0 for detection 
and correct failure isolat~on and zero probabil~ty of false alarm. The 
MTBF of the gyro ~s 13,333 hours and that of the accelerometers is 16,666 
hours. These numbers were obtained from Reference 2. A mission t~me of 
1 hour and zero probability of damage effects have been assumed. The 
nominal data rates for the three FOI system channels are also listed. 
3.8 Results 
A large number of Markov model computer runs were made to assess 
the effects of d~fferent system parameters on the reliability of the 
RSOIMU. Two baseline values of reliability were obtained. One ~s 
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Table 3. Markov model nominal parameters. 
Parameter Units Value 
Levels of FDI - 3. 
Hard Channel Data Rate Hz 50. 
Mid Channel Data Rate Hz 25. 
Soft Channel Data Rate Hz 2. 
Mission Time Hours 1. 
Gyro Failure Rate 1106 Hours 76. 
Accelerometer Failure Rate 1106 Hours 59. 
Probability of Failure Detection - 1.0 
Probability of Correct Failure Isolation - 1.0 
Probability of False Alarm - 0.0 
Probability of Damage Effects - 0.0 
2.576 x 10-12 which 1S the probability of system fa11ure for the nominal 
Markov model parameters presented in Table 3. The other baseline value 
is 5.397 x 10-4 which is the probability of system failure with no FDI and 
redundancy management present. Thus, an e1ght order of magnitude improve-
ment in RSDIMU re11ability can be obtained under optimum condit10ns. 
Other RSDIMU re1iab1lity results are graphically presented in 
Figures 6 through 12. Figure 6 shows the effect of gyro failure rate on 
the probability of RSDIMU system failure. The results 1ndicate that 
if the rel~ab~lity of one of the instruments is much worse than that of 
the other, that instrument will govern the reliability of the RSDIMU. 
Conversely, little improvement in system reliability can be ach~eved by 
improving the re1iab~lity of the more reliable instrument. 
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F~gure 6. Probab~l~ty of system failure vs. gyro failure rate. 
The effect of vary~ng the fa~lure rates of both the gyros and 
accelerometers together on the RSDIMU system reliab~l~ty ~s shown in 
Figure 7. The re11abi11ty of the RSDIMU improves three orders of 
magnitude for each order of magnitude improvement in the reliability of 
the gyros and accelerometers. 
The impact of false alarms on RSDIMU reliability 1S ~nd~cated ~n 
Figure 8. The~r effect is dependent upon the level of FDI system thresh-
olds selected, thus the 1ndependent variable in th1s study ~s the level 
of thresholds relat~ve to the ~nstrument noise level. Per sample values 
of the probability of false alarm (PFA) can be calculated making certain 
assumpt~ons. If the GLT method of FDI ~s assumed, the probability of 
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Figure 7. Probab~l~ty of system fa~lure vs. gyro and 
accelerometer fa~lure rates. 
false alarm can be calculated from an X2 probab~lity dens~ty function 
with n - 3 degrees of freedom (Reference 3). The resultant values of 
PFA are presented in Table 4. The results of this study indicate that 
a threshold level of 7.50 or greater will min~m~ze the ~mpact of false 
alarms on RSDIMU system reliab~lity. 
The next factor cons~dered ~n the study was the probability of 
failure detection for the soft-fa~lure FDI system channel. The results 
of the parametr~c study of th~s var~able are presented in F~gure 9. 
They indicate that a s~gn~ficant ~mprovement in system reliability is 
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Table 4. probability of false alarm for the 
RSOIMU Markov model reliability study. 
Threshold Number of Instruments 
(0) 4 3 2 
6 9.50 x 10-7 7.49 x 10-8 1.97 x 10-9 
7 2.22 x 10-9 1.30 x 10-10 2.56 x 10-12 
7.5 7.08 x 10-11 3.16 x 10-12 7.08 x 10-14 
8 1.81 x 10-12 8.21 x 10-14 1.25 x 10-15 
achieved by incorporat~ng some fault tolerance into the RSOIMU system. 
On the other hand, the achievement of the maximum ~mprovement in system 
re1iab~lity requires the detection of virtually all failures encountered. 
Mult~ple FOI channels can help signif~cantly in th~s regard because if a 
failure is not detected by one channel, it is a virtual certainty that 
~t will be detected by the channel in the hierarchy with the next smallest 
thresholds. Typ~ca1 values of the probability of detection, including 
self-test, run ~n the v~c~nity of 0.8 to 0.9. 
The previous results apply to the soft-failure channel. Param-
etric stud~es were also made of the mid-failure channel probabil~ty of 
detection with the soft-fa~lure channel probab~lity of detection equal 
to 1.0 because of the lowe~ thresholds, and similarly for the hard-failure 
channel. These results coincided with the value for the baseline case 
with perfect FOI for all cases. This conclusion is a consequence of 
the fact that a fa~lure can be detected from ~ts occurrence unt~l the 
end of the mission. If enough samples are taken, the probability of 
detecting the failure w~ll eventually reach unity and perfect FOI will 
be achieved. 
Figure 10 presents the effect of the probab~lity of correct isola-
tion for the soft-fa~lure channel on RSOIMU system reliability. The 
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results ind1cate that correct failure isolation is a must to obtain the 
maximum improvement in system reliability. Otherwise, an 1nstrument 
fa1lure is present wh1ch is defined as a system failure. 
The probabil1ty of damage 1S addressed in F1gure 11. On the aver-
age, an improvement of three orders of magnitude in system reliability 
for a one-hour mission 1S achieved because of the separation of the IMU 
into two units. 
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F1gure 11. Probabil1ty of system fa1lure VS. probab11ity of 
damage for a separated IMU system. 
1 X 10-4 
M1ss10n t1me and its effect on RSOIMU reliability was another 
parameter invest1gated. The results are presented in Figure 12. For 
realistic values of the probab11ity of detection for a single FOI system 
channel, system re1iab1lity appears to be virtually independent of mis-
sion time in contrast to a system w1th perfect FOI. 
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The last effort undertaken 1n th1s area was to blend all of the 
results generated thus far to come up with an estimate of the reliability 
of a typical operat1onal RSDIMU system. To do this, a gyro failure rate 
of 400/106 hours (MTBF of 2000 hours) and an accelerometer failure rate 
of 333/106 hours (MTBF of 3000 hours) were selected. These values were 
obtained from d1scussions w1th CSDL's Reliabi11ty and Quality Assurance 
Department. The thresholds were selected to be at 7.50 and the proba-
b1lity of damage effects was assumed to be zero. A probabil1ty of soft-
failure channel detection of 0.8 and a probability of correct soft-failure 
channel isolation of 0.99 were chosen. Use of these parameters resulted 
in a probab1lity of system failures of 4.27 x 10-7 which is three orders 
29 
of magnitude better than that of the system w~th no FDI and redundancy 
management. This number is dictated by the probability of failure detection. 
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4.1 Introduct~on 
SECTION 4 
DERIVATION OF DYNAMIC THRESHOLDS 
FOR THE DUAL, SEPARATED RSDIMU 
Reference 1 shows that some form of sensor uncertainty compensa-
t~on ~s needed to detect soft failures with the RSDIMU system. The 
basic problem is that a dynamic flight environment excites the sensor 
uncertainties to a greater extent than during cruise. Therefore, if it 
is desired to detect as small a failure as possible when the veh~cle is 
not maneuvering without encountering a prohibitive number of false alarms 
when the vehicle maneuvers, the environment must be compensated for in 
some fashion. 
Dynamic thresholds were suggested as a solution to this problem 
during the prev~ous CSDL program for NASA and a means for generat~ng 
them developed. The work was restricted to the case where both halves 
of the RSDIMU are colocated. The thresholds consist of a constant and a 
dyna~c port~on. The constant accounts for high frequency effects such 
as quantization and sensor noise. The dynamic portion accounts for 
the effects of maneuvering flight on the sensor errors. 
A block d~agram depict~ng the method used to generate the dynamic 
thresholds is shown ~n Figure 13. The overall idea embodied in this 
methodology is to parallel the development of the failure decision func-
tion using an analyt~c expression for the worst-case sensor error. In 
Figure 13 the top path is one channel of the FDI system block diagram 
presented in F~gure 3. The lower path describes the generation of the 
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Figure 13. Generation of dynam~c thresholds. 
thresholds. The last values of the veh~cle accelerations and rates ob-
tained from the sensor outputs are filtered in the same way as the parity 
equation res~duals. These quant~ties are then used to generate an upper 
bound for the parity equation residuals from an analytic expression. 
The threshold function is then generated in a manner corresponding to 
that ~n which the decision funct~on is generated. The fa~lure decision 
function and threshold are then compared to determine if a failure has 
occurred. 
The concept of dyna~c thresholds was evaluated via simulat~on 
to assess its feas~bil~ty, evaluate its effectiveness, and uncover any 
problems in applying ~t. A block diagram of the simulation used is shown 
in Figure 14. The core of the simulation is a six-degree-of-freedom air-
craft model w~th nonlinear aerodynamics. Also modeled are a fl~ght­
control system and turbulence. An autopilot "commands" the vehicle to 
follow a desired trajectory profile. Skewed gyro and accelerometer 
sensor configurat~ons are modeled w~th the location of the sensors variable 
to permit an assessment of accelerometer leVer-arm effects. The sensors 
are assumed to be of navigation quality and used for navigation and 
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Figure 14. Simulation block diagram. 
flight-control purposes. The FDI algorithm operates on the sensor data 
to generate the ~nput sign&ls to the flight-control and navigation sys-
tems. Navigat~on accuracy is assessed by differencing the outputs of a 
strapdown loca1-vertica1-wander-az~muth navigation system model and the 
vehicle states. 
Figure 15 shows the 1-hour flight profile used to evaluate the 
fault-tolerant system during the dynamic phases of the vehicle flight. 
The profile includes features from a typ~ca1 transport aircraft mission 
profile: a climb to altitude, cru~se, heading changes, descent, and a 
loiter maneuver. 
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The present program is concerned with the development and evalua-
tion of an analytic technique for the generat~on of FOI thresholds for 
an aircraft system w~th dual, separated IMUs. The intent is to use all 
available ~nstruments of both IMUs to detect and ~solate sensor fa~lures. 
The separation of the IMUs h~nders fa~lure detection and ~solation, 
since the raw structural-mode and accelerometer lever-arm effects wh~ch 
the instruments sense are comparable in magnitude to the failures which 
may be encountered and can result in the false detection of fa~lures if 
not properly accounted for. The selection of thresholds, a maJor con-
sideration ~n the development of any FOI system, ~s especially compl~cated 
when separated, commun~cating IMUs are present, ~ince these additional 
factors must be taken ~nto account. A spectrum of failure magnitudes 
from hard through soft ~s cons~dered. F~nally, a~rcraft maneuver~ng adds 
a sign~ficant dimens~on to the problem and dictates the need for variable 
failure-detection thresholds to prevent the occurrence of false alarms. 
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4.2 Structural-Mode Effects 
Each structural mode can be represented by a second-order dif-
ferent~al equation with add~tional terms wh~ch, in general, couple in 
the basic rigid-body airframe response, the other modes, and the control-
surface deflect~ons. The effect of the structural modes on the angular 
rates and linear accelerat~ons ~s a function of sensor location and is 
~ndicated by the follow~ng equat~ons 
= q + 0'ls 
= 
= n + on 
y YB 
n 
z 
= 
q + q. n + q. n + qn· n3 
n1 1 n2 2 3 
= 
= 
= 
4.3 Accelerometer Lever-Arm Effects 
(1) 
The linear accelerat~ons measured at a distance d meters from 
the cg of the vehicle (in terms of the linear accelerations at the cg 
of the vehicle and the accelerometer lever-arm effects) are defined by 
the following equations 
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4.4 Background 
The detect~on and isolation of the first two sensor failures and 
the detection of the third are requ~red for the RSOIMU. Dynamic FOI sys-
tem thresholds require an estimate of the incremental structural mode and 
accelerometer lever-arm effects between the locations of the two halves 
of the RSOIMU. References 4 and 5 descr~be a technique for generating these 
quantities which is satisfactory for the detection and isolation of the 
first sensor failure when the instruments are implemented in dual separated 
clusters. It uses the d~fferences of the least-square estimates of the 
body-axes rates or acceleration from each half of the RSOIMU. Th~s ap-
proach is valid only for the first failure because reconfiguration will 
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then leave only one instrument in one of the halves of the RSOIMU. The 
major contribution contained ~n this section of the report is the de-
velopment of a technique for generating the incremental structural mode 
and accelerometer lever-arm effects which is valid for multiple, nonconcur-
rent ~nstrument failures. 
A concept for the least-square estimation of the structural mode 
and lever-arm effects which evolves from that presented in References 4 
and 5 and which is applicable to multiple, nonconcurrent failures has 
been developed by Mr. F. Morrell of the NASA Langley Research Center. 
It uses least square estimates of all combinations of two vdl~d instruments 
to obta~n the desired information. Furthermore, it is rather simple in 
that the computation of only one component of the body axes rates or 
accelerations ~s required from the estimates obtained for each pair of 
sensors. 
This sect~on of the report describes a different approach to the 
problem using what is called a sensor-error est~mation approach. Basic-
ally, the approach ~s to compute the least-square est~mates of the body-
axes rates or accelerations using one of the RSOIMU halves w~th unfailed 
instruments. Est~mates of the instrument outputs for the other half of 
the RSOIMU are computed us~ng the estimated body axes quantities and the 
nominal sensor geometry matrix. The actual and estimated sensor outputs 
are then d~fferenced to produce estimates of the sensor uncertainties. 
Estimates of the structural mode and lever-arm effects are then generated 
by resolving the estimated sensor uncertainties through the FOI system 
parity equat~ons. The absolute value of these estimated structural mode 
and lever-arm effects is then used as the worst case est~ate for the 
thresholds. 
The techn~que just descr~bed ~s der~ved for the EVT algorithm 
initially and later extended to the GLT. The accelerometers are considered 
rather than the gyros s~nce both structural-mode and lever-arm effects must 
be considered. It ~s also assumed that filtering is present ~n the FOI 
channel being cons~dered to indicate how this aspect of the system ~s 
treated. 
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4.5 EVT Parity Equations 
The EVT parity equations are presented in th1s section. A complete 
derivation is included in Reference 1. The formulation 1S based on the 
projection of rates or accelerations measured in two planes along the 
line of intersection of the planes. As the measurement planes are ortho-
gonal to the sp1n or pendulous axes, the "edge vectors" are defined by 
the line mutually perpend1cular to these axes. They are the vectors, 
defined in F1gure 1. Rates or accelerat10ns measured in the 1 and J 
planes may be compared if they are expressed in a common frame. The 
e .. , 
1J 
frame chosen here 1S the body frame. Then the residual R . may be expressed 1J 
by 
R . 
1J 
= 
B 
• e. 
1J 
If IR .. I > T, an FDI threshold, then a miscompare flag, F .. , is set. 
1) 1) 
FDI consists of logical operat1ons on the flags F ..• 
1) 
For the case lUlder consideration, the accelerometer inputs are de-
fined by the matrix equation 
m a 
-a y aA1 
m 
aB1 
-a a y 
m a a y aA2 
m -a 
-a y n aB2 = x 
m -a a y n aA3 y 
m a -a y n aB3 z 
m 
-a -a y aA4 
m a a y aB4 
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where 
13- 1 
a = 
213 
a 13+ 1 = 213 
1 
Y = 13 
The edge vector parity equations are 
1 B B B B 
R12 = (w - w1y + w - W2z ) f2 2y lz 
1 B B B B 
R13 = (w - w3x + w - W1y ) f2 lx 3y 
1 B B B B 
R14 (w4x - w + w - w4z ) f2 lx lz 
1 B B B B R23 = (w - w3x + w - w3z ) 12 2x 2z 
1 B B B B 
R24 (w2x - w + w - w4y ) li. 4x 2y 
1 B B B B 
R34 = (W3y - w + w - w4z ) f2 4y 3z 
where the body axes accelerations for each instrument are 
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B 
-am Wly = + am aAl ~l 
B y(m ) wlz = +m aAl aBl 
B 
am w2x = - am aA2 aB2 
B 
- am w2y = am aA2 aA2 
B y(m ) w2z = +m aA2 aB2 
B 
+ am w3x = -am aA3 a B3 
B 
am w3y = - am aA3 aB3 
B y(m +m ) w3z = aA3 aB3 
B 
-am w4x = + am aA4 a B4 
B + am w4y = -am aA4 aB4 
B y(m +m ) w4z = aA4 a B4 
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Combining the last two sets of equations results in the parity 
equations 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
1 R a + y) (m - m ) + (y - a.) (m 1:2 L aAl aB2 aBl 
1 
1:2 
m 
~l 
1 ny - a.) (m - m ) + (y + a) (m 1:2 L aAl aB4 aBl 
1 rca + y) (m - m ) + (y - a.) (m 1:2 L aA2 aB3 aB2 
1 R a + y) (m - m ) + (y - a.) (m 1:2 L aA3 aB4 aB3 
4.6 The Der~vation of Dynamic Thresholds for the EVT 
(3) 
The basic approach is to start with an analytic expression for 
the sensor error, structural-mode, and lever-arm effects and obtain ex-
pressions for the parity-equation residuals. Upper bounds for the 
parity-equation residuals are then determined. The FD! system threshold 
is generated by duplicating the steps involved in the computat~on of 
the failure-decision function using the upper bounds for the par~ty­
equation res~duals rather than the actual residuals. 
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It is necessary to write expressions for the linear accelera-
t10ns at one IMU location in terms of those at the others. Using the 
right half of the RSDIMU as a reference and Eq. (1) and (2) leads to 
the following results 
n = n + on 
xL xR x 
= n + on - on 
xR xl/, x aL Jl.aR 
n = n + on 
YL YR Y 
= n + on - on + on - on 
YR Yl/,a Yl/,a YB YB L R L R 
n = n + on 
zL zR Z 
= n + on - on + on - on 
zR Zl/,a
L 
Z zB zB l/,aR L R 
The output of the jth accelerometer of the right IMU can be 
written as 
m 
a. 
J 
= + om a. 
J 
j = A3, B3, A4, B4 (4) 
om is a term representing the sensor errors. The sensor models assumed 
a j 
for this study, described 1n detail in Reference 1, result 1n 
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om 
a, 
J 
= 
+ (llJ3 + E, • H'3)n J J ZR 
+ a IP , (HJ'l • n + HJ'2 • n + HJ'3 • n ) J XR YR ZR 
• (-~ • n + --PJ'2 • n + HP • n ) ~l ~. J'3 J xR YR zR 
j = A3, B3, A4, B4 (5) 
th A si~lar expression is obtained for the output of the k accelerometer 
of the left IMU using the appropriate accelerations. Use of the equa-
tions for the accelerations measured by the left half of the RSDIMU in 
terms of those of the right half leads to 
m = Hkl . n + ~2 . n + ~3 • n ak xR YR zR 
+ om + Hkl • on + ~2 • on + Hk3 • on ak x Y Z 
k = Al, Bl, A2, B2 (6) 
Calculat1ng the residuals from Eq. (3) results in 
= 1 r(a + y) (om - om ) 12 L aAl aB2 
+ (y - a) (om - om >] 
~l aA2 
= 1:... rom - om 12 L aAl aBl 
+ onx - ony] 
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R14 = 
R23 = 
+ 
R24 = 
= 
1 [(y - a) (om - om ) + (y + a) (om - om ) 
.fi. aA1 aB4 ~l aA4 
- on + onz] x 
1 ~a + y) (om - om ) + (y - a) (om - om ) 
.fi. aA2 aB3 aB2 aA3 
on + onz] x 
1 [Oll' - om + om - om + on + ony] 
.fi. aA2 aB2 aA4 aB4 x 
1 l1a + y) (om - om ) + (y - a) (om - om )1 
.fi. L aA3 aB4 ~3 aA4 J 
Several observations can be made from a consideration of the 
previous equations. First, the parity equation residuals are a function 
only of the uncertainties associated with the instruments. The parity 
equations remove the effects of the measured variables, i.e., accelera-
tions or rates. Second, the parity equation residuals for the IMUs 
where the 1nstruments are colocated, 1.e., R12 and R34 , are not affected 
by the separation effects due to lever arms, bending and vibration as are 
the other parity equation residuals. If the left IMU is used as a 
reference, the same expressions for the residuals result with the excep-
tion that the signs of the on , on , and on terms are reversed. 
x y z 
A set of dynamic thresholds can be obtained by determining an 
upper bound for each of the residuals. Performing a worst case analysis 
leads to 
44 
= 2.8284 om + ~ 1 (on - on >fl 
am 1:2 x y 
R14 2.45 om 
1 
1 (-on + on >fl +-a 1:2 x z m m 
R23 2.45 om 
1 
1 (on + on >fl = +-a 1:2 x z m m 
R24 2.8284 om 
1 
1 (on + on >fl = +-a 1:2 x y m m 
R34 = 2.45 om a (7) 
m m 
om is an analytic express10n for the upper bound of the sensor 
a 
m 
error effects. This expression 1S solved in real time using the fol-
lowing equat10n 
om 
a 
m 
+ € (IO.788675n 1 + IO.788675n 1 + IO.577350n~ I> 
am x f Yf .... f 
+ (SII + alP >[(IO.788675nxl + IO.788675ny l + IO.577350nzl>2]f} 
m m 
(8) 
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the 
and 
om is obta1ned from Eq. (5) by assum1ng worst case condit10ns: 
a 
m 
. f PdP. I h magn1tude 0 Hjl , Hj2 , Hjl an Hj2 1S ess t an or equal to 0.788675, 
the sensor errors are additive and bounded by their 30 values. Use 
is also made of the fact that Hj3 = 0.577350. This is sign1ficant S1nce 
the steady-state value of the maX1mum par1ty-equation residual governs 
the value of the soft failure detected with the FOI system. Th1s steady-
state value is governed by the instrument bias and the effect of the l-g 
normal accelerat10n obta1ned during straight and level flight on the 
other sensor errors. This latter effect is 1nfluenced by the 
of Hj3 • Thus, the use of the coeff1c1ent HJ3 = 0.577350 w111 
lower threshold and the ab1l1ty to detect smaller failures. 
magnitude 
result in a 
In the same manner, the angle of the accelerometer pendulous axis 
with respect to the x-y plane of the vehicle affects the level of soft 
failure detected through H~3 and the input-pendulous-axes coupling error. 
p 
For this study, the accelerometers are mounted such that Hj3 = 0.577350, 
i.e., at the same angle with respect to the x-y plane as the input axes 
of the instruments. 
Rl3 ' Rl4 ' R23 ' and R24 each conta1n a term which reflects the 
m m m m 
incremental value of the separation effects between the two IMU locations. 
If three or more 1ndependent measurements are available at each IMU loca-
tion, the requ1red quant1t1tes can be obta1ned by generating a least-squares 
solution for n , n , and n at each lMU locat10n and differencing like 
x y z 
quantities. This approach falls apart after the first failure is de-
tected and isolated since one instrument is analytically removed from 
the system. Therefore, a least-squares solution can be obtained for 
only one IMU. 
A technique has been developed for generating the incremental 
separat10n effects which overcomes the deficiencies of the approach de-
scribed in the previous paragraph. The least-squares solution of only 
one of the IMUs is required. Assume for the purposes of discussion that 
the right IMU is selected as the reference. This 1S a minor restriction 
which will be removed later. A least-squares solut10n can be obtained 
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for the right IMU resulting in the estimated quantites n ,n ,and 
x R YR 
A 
n • An estimate of the separation effects on the instruments of the 
zR 
left IMU can be obtained by using n ,n ,and n to generate an 
x R YR zR 
estimate of the measurements of the left lMU and subtracting them from 
the actual measurements. For example 
A A A 
m = an - Sn + yn aAl xR YR ZR 
A A 
om = m - m aAl aAl aAl 
A A ) yen - ) = a(n - n ) - S(n - n + n 
XL xR YL YR zL zR 
= ao~ - So~ + yo~ 
x Y Z (9) 
Following this procedure leads to 
= -So~ + ao~ + yon 
x Y Z 
o~ A ao~ A = Son + + yon aA2 x Y Z 
om 
A 
Son yon = -aon - + aB2 x Y Z 
(10) 
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Since the r~ght lMU is the reference 
om = 0 
aA4 
" Om 0 (11) 
a B4 
Consider the parity equation R13 • Any uncertainty in the measure-
ments from instruments 1 and 3 is reflected in R13 according to the 
equation 
Substituting Eq. (9), (10), and (11) ~nto Eq. (12) leads to 
= 
1 
12 
[o~ - o~ ] 
x y 
which is an estimate of the quant~ty needed for the threshold. 
(12) 
Thus, the procedure for generating an estimate of the effects of 
the IMU separation for the thresholds is to generate a least-squares 
solution for the accelerations of one of the IMUs of the system. These 
estimates are then used to form an estimate of the measurements of the 
other IMU. The est~mated measurements are subtracted from the true 
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measurements to obtain the estimated effects of the separation on the 
measurements. The quantities needed for the thresholds are then obtained 
by resolving these uncerta~nties through the parity equations. The 
absolute value of the solution is used for the thresholds. 
Several additional items regarding the thresholds should be 
pointed out at this time. One is that the last value of the linear ac-
celerations (generated for the flight-control system from the sensor 
signals) can be used to generate the thresholds. Using these signals 
results in thresholds which reflect the current state of the aircraft 
and its env~ronment. 
The effect of the filtering present in the mid- and soft-failure 
channels on the generat~on of the thresholds is now considered. In 
order to make a valid comparison between the residuals and thresholds, 
it is necessary to filter each in an identical fashion. It is prefer-
able to f~lter the quantities required for the thresholds before the 
maximization and absolute values are generated. This results in a 
reduced level of no~se which is not subject to max~izat~on and leads 
to lower, more realistic thresholds. 
The subscr~pt f in Eq. (7) and (8) indicates where the filtering 
should occur in the generat~on of the thresholds. When n , n , and n 
x y z 
linearly affect the parity-equation residuals, it is possible to inter-
change the operations of addition and multiplication by a constant and 
filtering. It is not valid to do th~s with the nonlinear, input-axes-
squared, and input-pendulous~axes-coupling errors, however. The non-
l~near quantity must be formed and then filtered. 
A development corresponding to the one undertaken with the right 
IMU as the reference can be generated using the left IMU as the reference. 
The same expressions for the thresholds as presented in Eq. (7) are ob-
tained. For th~s case 
= = = = 0.0 
49 
Nonzero est~mates for the separation effects on instruments 3 and 4 
result which are 
am = -aon + eon + yon aA3 x y z 
~ 
eon - aon 
~ 
am = + yon aB3 x y z 
= -eon - aon + yon 
x y z 
aon + eon + yon 
x y z 
The effects of these quantities on the res~duals are of the same magnitude 
but oppos~te in sign to those obta~ned previously. Thus the same thresh-
olds result. 
It is necessary to exam~ne the effect of failures on the thresh-
olds. The stat~st~cs of the parity equation residuals change to reflect 
the presence of a fa~lure, e.g., the mean changes due to a b1as fa11ure. 
If one of the ~nstruments of the reference IMU fa1ls, the least-square 
estimate of the accelerations or rates will change to reflect the presence 
of this failure. This fa1lure w1ll in turn affect the thresholds via the 
terms generated to account for the separation effects. S1milarly if 
the fa1lure occurs in one of the 1nstruments not in the reference IMU, 
the instrument output used to generate the separation effects will reflect 
the failure and result in a change in the threshold. As things presently 
stand, both the residuals and thresholds change due to a failure and 
detection and isolation is not possible. Modifications must be made 
to the FDI algorithm to el1minate th1S deficiency. 
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The techn~que employed is to pass the estimated separat~on ef-
fects through washout filters before taking the absolute value for the 
thresholds. These filters have the effect of attenuating the low-
frequency data of the signals while pass~ng the high-frequency data intact. 
Washout filtering removes the effect of the instrument biases and bias 
failures from the separation effects so that the thresholds return to 
their prefa~lure values. The parity equation residuals change to reflect 
the effect of the fa~lures and failure detection and isolation occurs 
when the thresholds are exceeded. 
The approach def~ned ~n the previous paragraph will also work 
properly for nonb~as-type fa~lures. The washout f~lter has a differen-
tiating effect on the separation effects so that the residuals change 
as a function of the ~ntegra1 of the effect on the thresholds. For 
example, consider a ramp failure. The residuals will change 1~near1y 
w~th t~me wh~le the thresholds will change by a constant amount. 
It ~s not necessary to washout filter the portion of the FOI 
thresholds due to the sensor errors. This is true s~nce any error 
effect in the least-squares estimate of the accelerations is modified 
by the 30 value of a sensor error which reduces ~ts effect to second 
order. 
The FOI a1gor~thm Just developed offers several possibilities 
for implementation. The most conservative approach but also the most 
demand~ng in terms of computational requirements would involve the 
implementation of two ident~ca1 FOI algorithms, one using each IMU as 
a reference. This scheme affords dual detect~on capability for the 
first fa~lure, a feature wh~ch would lower the false alarm rate. The 
algorithm assoc~ated w~th the IMU containing unfailed instruments 
could then be used for the detection and ~solation of the second and 
third failures. 
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The FDI algor~thm proposed accounts for factors such as the de-
tection and isolation of soft instrument failures, the effects of vehicle 
dynamics, and IMU separation. It is valid as long as the basic assump-
tions upon which the thresholds are derived are valid. One instance 
where this may not be true is when saturation-type failures occur for 
which the instrument outputs do not contain information about the 
separation effects. If the fa~lure is large enough, it w~ll be detected 
and isolated v~a the hard-failure channel and the system reconfigured 
to eliminate its effect before the instrument output ~s used. The 
shorting of an ~nstrument output is an example of this type of fa~l-
ure. It is equ~valent to a fa~lure of a large magn~tude and is 
detected via the hard-failure channel on the f~rst subsequent pass of 
the FDI algorithm. Bu~lt-in test equipment (BITE) would also be 
valuable in detecting and isolat~ng failures of th~s nature and should 
be an integral part of the final FDI system. 
4.7 Description of the GLT Algor~thm 
The GLT algorithm is briefly described in this section. Consider 
first the hard-failure channel. In the absence of sensor failures, the 
measurement equation is 
m = Hw + ~ (13) 
A set of parity equations is defined by 
p = Vm (14) 
where 
VH = 0 
V is assumed to be of dimension (n - 3) x n. The matrix V can be chosen 
so that 
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= I 
Substituting Eq. (13) into Eq. (14) y~elds 
In the absence of sensor fa~lures, PN depends only on the measurement 
no~se. If sensor ) experiences a b~as-type fa~lure and that failure 
~s man~fest as an apparent b~as sh~ft of magn~tude b ~n measurement ), 
then 
= Vr, + V b 
) 
The difference in the stat~stics of PN (~n the absence of failures) and 
PF (in the presence of failures) prov~des a basis for detect~ng and iso-
lating fa~lures. The problems of detecting and isolating sensor failures 
fall with~n the general framework of composite hypothes~s tests, since 
the s~gn as well as the magn~tude of the b~as failure is unknown a pr~or~. 
A GLT formation of the detect~on and isolat~on problems has been 
developed. Assume s~ngle-ax~s failures initially. The GLT decision 
functions for detection and isolat~on are 
OFO 
T P P 
OFI = 
~pTVj)2 
j = 1,2, ••• ,n (15) T 
) V,V, ) ) 
These decision functions are strictly functions of the parity-equation 
residuals, p. The detection decis~on is made by comparing OFO (wh~ch is 
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the sum of the squares of the parity-equation residuals) to a detection 
threshold. A sensor failure results in a change in the mean value of a 
sensor output, the parity-equation res~duals, and the failure-detection 
function. The isolation decis~on is then made by determining max (DF I ). 
] J 
The value of ] that max~mizes DFI identifies the sensor that is most 
J 
hkely to have failed. 
The preceding d~scussion assumes a set of n SDOF instruments. 
The extension to TDOF sensors requires certain modificat~ons to reflect 
the character~st~cs of these instruments. Correlation between the no~se 
present in the two n,easurements der~ved from a TDOF sensor is possible. 
One approach is to assume no correlation, design the FDI algor~thms 
accordingly, and examine the degradation of FDI performance which oc-
curs due to the presence of the nonzero values of correlation. This 
approach leads to the simplest algorithms and is preferred when the per-
formance penalty incurred for nonzero values of correlation is accept-
ably small. In this case, the detect~on problem formulation ~s not changed, 
and the appropr~ate dec~sion funct~on ~s g~ven by Eq. (15). 
In formulat~ng the ~solat~on problem, another character~st~c of 
TDOF sensors must be considered. A TDOF sensor failure may be reflected 
in either or both of ~ts measurement axes. In practice, a fa~lure ob-
served in either axis ~s sufficient to d~squalify the data from both of 
the sensor axes. Thus, isolation of a failed sensor rather than of a 
failed ax~s is suffic~ent. The isolation problem then involves testing 
only n/2 hypotheses. The GLT dec~s~on function for isolat~on wh~ch 
corresponds to Eq. (15) ~s 
= j = 1,2, ••• ,n/2 
where v] = [V2j _1 'V2]] and V2j _1 'V2] are the two columns of the V 
matr~x associated with TDOF sensor j. 
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The detection and isolat~on of the mid and soft failures ~s ac-
compl~shed using the same decision functions as for the hard-failure 
channel. The only exception is that the appropriately filtered parity-
equation res~duals are used in lieu of the unfiltered ones. 
4.8 The Derivation of Dyna~c Thresholds for the GLT 
The same general approach used to generate the dynamic thresholds 
in the case of the EVT appl~es to the GLT. Assume that the r~ght half 
of the RSDIMU is the reference. Subst~tuting Eq. (4) and (6) ~nto the 
par~ty equations results in the following residuals 
P, = L: V.. om + ~ V k (K . on + Hk20n + K 30n ) ... ~J a . LJk ~ - k~ x y. k z J J 
i = 1,2, ••• ,n-3; j = Al,Bl, ••• ,A4,B4; k = Al,BI,A2,B2 
(16) 
This expression results since VH = O. It consists of two terms. The 
firsc results from the sensor errors and the second from the ~ncremental 
structural mode and lever-arm effects between the locations of the two 
halves of the RSDIMU. 
An upper bound for Eq. (16) ~s 
= 
i = 1,2, ••• ,n-3; j = Al,Bl, ••• ,A4,B4; k = A1,Bl,A2,B2 
(17) 
The dynam~c threshold ~s then obtained by summing the squares of the 
upper bound for each parity equat~on, i.e., duplicat~ng the generation 
of the dec~sion funct~on. The resulting express~on is 
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n-3 
T = L (18) 
i=l 
In order to calculate the FDI system thresholds, Eq. (18), and 
hence Eq. (17), must be calculated in real time. Consider the first 
term of Eq. (17). The V ,'s are known and om ~s the upper bound for 
~J am 
the sensor errors g~ven by Eq. (8). The only terms that have to be 
determined are the incremental effects of the structural modes and lever 
arms, i.e., the (Hk1onx + ~2ony + Hk30nz ) terms. They may be generated 
by using the sensor error est~mation approach described for the EVT. 
The derivat~on of Eq. (9), (10), and (11) demonstrate the method. 
Many comments were made during the development of the dynamic 
thresholds for the EVT approach regarding their implementation, the 
low-pass f~ltering and washout f~lter, for example. All of these com-
ments apply to the GLT approach as well but are not repeated here for 
brevity. 
4.9 S1mulat~on Val~dation and Results 
Both the least-square and sensor-error techniques for est~mating 
the structural-mode and lever-arm effects have been programmed 1nto the 
CSDL s~mulat~on descr~bed in Sect~on 4.1 to validate the concepts and 
uncover any add~tional problems which may exist w~th regard to the~r 
~mplementation. 
An example of the results obtained is shown in Figure 16 and 
Table 5. These results were obtained using the GLT algorithm w1th three 
soft accelerometer fa~lures introduced into the aircraft system flying 
the trajectory presented ~n Figure 15. Table 5 indicates when the failures 
were introduced, the~r magnitudes, the failed axis and the t~me at which 
the failures were detected. The t~me h~stories presented ~n F~gure 16 
show the hard-, mid-, and soft-failure decisions functions obtained during 
the one-hour fl1ght and the soft-fa~lure channel threshold implemented 
via Eq. (18). Consider first the fa~lure dec~sion functions. The 
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Figure 16. 
Time of Fai 1 ure 
Input 
sec 
617 
1100 
2200 
TIME (min) 
Accelerometer FDI system decision functions 
soft-channel threshold decision functions. 
and 
Table 5. Simulation example data. 
r~agni tude of Axis Detection Time 
Failure 
119 sec 
3000 B2 633.48 
3000 B3 1113.98 
4000 B4 2209.98 
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hard-failure channel decision function response is characterized by 
2 quantization no~se. Its magnitude of (7770 ~g) set a lower bound on 
the magnitude of failure wh~ch can be detected reliably with this channel 
without false alarms. The effect of low-pass filtering to enhance the 
detectability of smaller failures is evident from the mid- and soft-
failure channel decis~on functions. The effect of the three failures is 
clearly evident in the soft-failure channel decision funct~on. The 
first two spikes are caused by the introduct~on of the first two fa~lures 
into the system and the el~minat~on of their effects by reconfigurat~on. 
The third failure is evident as a step response in the soft-failure de-
cis~on funct~on since the fa~lure can only be detected and not isolated. 
The effect of vehicle maneuvers are also evident, e.g., the spikes super-
imposed on the step effect due to the third failure. These are caused 
by the loiter maneuver. 
The soft-fa~lure channel threshold is also shown in Figure 16. 
An initial engage transient ~s present ~n th~s response along w~th sp~kes 
due to the f~rst two sensor fa~lures. The washout f~lter in the thresh-
old generat~on algorithm causes the thresholds to return to their pre-
failure values, resulting ~n fa~lure detection. After each of the first 
two failures are detected and the system reconfigured, a lower threshold 
results since fewer parity equat~ons are required for detect~on and ~sola-
tion. With the detection of the third fa~lure, the thresholds are set to 
zero in the algorithm. Maneuver effects are also evident in the threshold. 
The results of the s~ulat~on tend to confirm the validity of the 
sensor-error and least-square estimat~on techniques for generating es-
timates of the incremental structural mode and lever-arm effects for dy-
namic thresholds. Mult~ple, nonconcurrent fa~lures have been detected 
and ~solated using both concepts. However, ~t is caut~oned that only a 
limited number of evaluat~ons have been made and further ref~nements to 
the algorithm may result from more extensive test~ng. 
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SECTION 5 
SUMMARY 
Two major goals were ach~eved during the course of th~s program. 
The f~rst was the development and applicat~on of a techn~que for quan-
titatively evaluating the reliabil~ty of the RSDIMU. A detailed de-
velopment of the Markov model generated for th~s purpose was presented. 
The results of the study of the ~mpact of pert~nent system parameters 
on the reliab~l~ty of the RSDIMU were discussed. Many significant 
conclusions were drawn from these results. For example, the impact 
of false alarms on system rel~ability was one of those d~scussed ~n 
Section 3.1. 
The second maJor goal ach~eved during this program was the de-
velopment of an algor~thm for generat~ng dynamic thresholds for the dual, 
separated RSDIMU which ~s valid for the detect~on of mult~ple, noncon-
current failures. It takes into account the incremental effects of the 
structural modes and acceleromeLer lever arms between the two sensor 
locat~ons which are a significant factor. A techn~que called the 
sensor-error method of est~mating these quantities was presented. In 
addit~on to an analytic development of this algorithm, the results of 
its evaluation via s~mulation are presented and d~scussed. 
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